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Copyright © The Levy Economics Institute 2004 All rights reserved.Can a reduction in the number of games of golf adversely affect the economy? Firms and 
homebuyers are relying less on commercial banks than they did in the past, and while many 
authors have examined this trend, few have noted its social aspects.  
Most economists would acknowledge that some sort of change is under way in the way 
consumers and firms borrow money. Bonds now account for two-thirds of nonfinancial business 
debt outstanding, compared to one-half as recently as 1985 (Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors 2003; Bassett and Zakrajšek 2003). The number of new commercial and industrial 
bank loans has been falling monthly (Economagic 2003; Bassett and Zakrajšek 2003). A large 
portion of the loan market is now accounted for by syndicated loans, which are held mostly by 
banks with no ongoing relationship to the borrower and are traded in secondary markets (Bassett 
and Zakrajšek 2003, 487–490). This trend parallels the increasing dominance of Freddie Mac 
and Fannie Mae in the mortgage markets. These “government-sponsored enterprises,” which 
package mortgages into bonds for sale to the public, now guarantee or own roughly half of the 
mortgages outstanding in the United States (Economist 2003). 
These trends can be seen as part of a commodification, or marketization, of the credit 
markets. Certainly, traditional bank loans are in many ways commodities. But consider some 
characteristics of bonds. Publicly issued securities are traded on anonymous public markets by 
firms and securities owners do not have any intimate knowledge of the issuer. Investors are 
indifferent between two bonds with the same risk-return profile. Some securities, especially 
mortgaged-backed securities, are traded as members of a broad, generic category, rather than as 
the obligations of particular persons or firms. Generally, members of a class of bond trade at 
similar values, as would two different bushels of wheat of the same quality. The owner of a 
bond typically has little personal contact with the firm or bank that originally issued the security 
and may hold the bond for a very short period of time. Often a bond is held as part of a very 
diverse portfolio, so that the owner has only a small stake in the profitability of the issuing firm.  
There is significant evidence, summarized below, that commercial bank loans do not 
share most of these qualities and are in that sense not commodities (Uzzi 1999). One important 
difference is that bank borrowers are offered an interest rate that is set by the bank—not the 
market—and that may be lower for “good customers.” Firms with an ongoing relationship to a 
bank may receive favorable treatment in many respects. In return, they may pass along 
information to their banks to which an “arm’s length” lender might not have access. Ties 
between borrower and lender partly take the form of personal relationships and social  2
interaction, and not simply business letters and contracts. They may be governed by norms of 
reciprocation, rather than specific quid-pro-quos. To the degree that bank finance is, to use a 
sociological term, “embedded” in ongoing personal relationships, it is not a commodity 
(Anderson 1993; Mirowski 1990).  
Whether bank loans are market goods discussed below. Assuming there has been a shift 
to less personal forms of finance, what might be some of the implications of the shift for 
policymaking? If bankers are discriminatory in forming relationships, a reduction in the 
personal aspects of obtaining loans might be desirable in many respects. An example would be 
an improvement in the fairness of the lending process. But not all goods are best treated in an 
impersonal way. Concerns surrounding the rise of bond finance can fall within several broad 
areas.  
First, there are macroeconomic implications. Some economists have argued that with 
banks accounting for a shrinking portion of business loans, monetary policy has lost its 
effectiveness (D’Arista 2002; Estrella 2002; Palley 2003). Some scholars believe that in the 
past, when banks were the primary lenders to business, the Federal Reserve Bank could 
influence the amount of lending by constraining or easing the availability of reserves to the 
banking system. Since those who hold bonds are not required to keep reserves on hand, such 
actions have little effect on debt securities sales. 
Another area of policy concern is governance. Commercial banks often monitor firms’ 
activities and can exert some control, ensuring that their funds are not misused. Owners of 
bonds, having a more distant relationship with borrowers, do not have the information and 
leverage needed to discipline them in this way. 
Finally, the changing form of finance may have implications for equality of access to 
credit. Since investment increasingly takes the form of securities purchases, it matters whether 
women and minority group members are excluded from debt markets. 
The paper finds that neither commercial bank loans nor securities sales are generally 
preferable from the point of view of efficiency, governance, equality of access, or the potency of 
monetary policy. The well-known attributes of bank and financial market lending, respectively, 
are less economically functional than many observers believe. The main duty of a lender to 
assess risk, and neither type of lender can surmount the biases and irrational aspects of 
estimating risk. Risk is always gauged within a framework of convention and is subject to racial 
and other biases. Nevertheless the fairness and efficiency of the lending process is potentially  3
subject to improvement. Several existing institutions point the way toward such improvement, 
but to simply reverse course and return to traditional commercial banking would be a retrograde 
step. Making the financial sector truly rational will require policymakers to think seriously 
about race, gender, and class and about the distribution of power. 
 
WHAT DO BANKS DO? 
 
The recent changes in finance fit the general pattern of commodification identified by Anderson 
and other experts on the differences between economic and noneconomic goods. We would like 
to know what is at stake, from a policy perspective, in this commodification. What has been lost 
with the move toward securities finance will depend upon what banks actually do when they 
make loans, and how they go about it. Two groups of economists who have studied this issue 
are the imperfect information school and the social economists. I examine their views in the 
next two sections, and then suggest some extensions in the next section. 
Economists and sociologists generally agree that the role played by commercial banks 
has something to do with their ability to counter dishonest borrower behavior and deal with risk 
(Bernanke 1983; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999). In a seminal 
paper on the role of banks in the Great Depression, Bernanke argued that banks are unique in 
their ability to lend to small “idiosyncratic” borrowers, who did not have access to the bond 
market (1983). Banks are able to intermediate between their depositors and small borrowers 
because they are specialists in making certain money is lent to “good” borrowers. Their 
techniques include: 
 
“developing expertise at evaluating potential borrowers; establishing long-term 
relationships with customers; and offering loan conditions that encourage 
potential borrowers to self-select in a favorable way” (263). 
 
The costs of this sort of activity (“costs of credit intermediation” or CCI), including application 
and monitoring costs and losses on bad loans, rise when the normal operations of the 
commercial banking system are disrupted, as they were during the period 1930 to 1933.  
 
Subsequent elaborations of the imperfect information theory of banking have built on the same 
concepts as Bernanke’s article. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) devised a model in which projects  4
varied in their riskiness. In Stiglitz and Weiss’s model, banks were unable to determine the 
riskiness of a project without some sort of “screening” device, such as credit rationing. When 
interest rates were relatively high, borrowers with relatively low-risk, low return projects would 
withdraw from the loan market, leaving only high-risk borrowers. It was in the interests of 
banks, then, to keep interest rates below the so-called “market-clearing” level, a strategy that left 
some borrowers unable to obtain funds at any interest rate. 
One feature of Stiglitz and Weiss’s model is that banks may screen companies based not 
only on the interest rate they are willing to pay, but also on observable characteristics that may 
be correlated with risk. So, entire groups may be redlined, or unable to borrow at any interest 
rate. 
Rationing credit is not the only means available to banks to deal with imperfect 
information about potential borrowers. They may establish long-term contracts that punish 
failure to repay a loan in some future period (Townsend 1982). For example, a loan contract 
could require any unpaid loan amount to be rescheduled over future dates. This would reduce 
the incentive to borrow for non-legitimate purposes or to misuse money, once it has been 
borrowed.  
Thus, Neo-Keynesians have thus been discussing the unique role of commercial banks 
for some time. In their view, commercial banks are experts in reducing the costs associated with 
various forms of risk that arise in an environment of asymmetric information. The purpose of 
banks is to deal with unobservable characteristics of the borrower and his or her endeavors. 
Ordinary investors are shielded from some crucial information. Banks solve this problem by 
setting up a contractual link with the borrower. The contract may “solve” the informational 
problem by requiring collateral, setting a below-market-clearing interest rate, or establishing a 
long-term relationship (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Townsend 1982). 
To their credit, the imperfect-information Keynesians recognize the importance of bank 
credit, vis-à-vis other forms of lending. They argue that the relationship between the bank and 
its client is important and that such relationships, not just the interest rate, are crucial to the 
functioning of the credit market.  
 
So, this group of Keynesians offers one possible answer to the question, what might be 
lost with the decline of commercial and industrial lending by banks? Their answer is that 
problems of asymmetric information will re-emerge unless they are solved in some other way.  5
Bondholders cannot be assured of the probity of the borrower in the same manner that 
commercial bankers can. We will see that this will generate policy problems distinct from those 
raised so far by observers of the credit-to-securities trend. But the New-Keynesians have not 
adequately theorized about the social aspects of lending. 
 
SOCIAL ECONOMISTS’ INSIGHTS INTO BANKING 
 
An alternative view of what is at stake in the waning of commercial bank business loans is 
suggested by a different group of researchers altogether. Recently, social economists have 
begun to investigate the properties of bank credit, particularly its social aspects (Keister 2002). 
A number of findings have emerged. First, borrowers who have long-term relationships with a 
certain bank tend to be able to borrow at lower interest rates than those who do not purchase 
multiple services from one bank or do not have long-term ongoing relationships with a bank 
(Uzzi 1999, 487). Second, particular bankers are often friends of a sort with their customers and 
customers’ families, and they feel they can trust those customers more than others (488).  
Third, borrowers of high social station or with connections to powerful individuals often 
enjoy unusually good access to credit  (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001, 640). Fourth, race and 
gender matter (Uzzi 1999). Fifth, the availability of credit to a firm is partly influenced by the 
presence of bankers on the firm’s board of directors, and by the school from which the CEO 
graduated (Keister 2002, 44). Sixth, bankers often make use of third parties—with whom they 
are tied by religion, ethnicity, or nationality—to verify the honesty of a borrower (Ferrary 2003; 
Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001). Seventh, when credit is tight, banks are more likely to restrict the 
supply of funds to new customers than to established ones (Wolfson 1994, 177). 
Most or all of these findings conflict with the characteristics of a market good described 
by philospher Elizabeth Anderson, since they indicate that access to credit depends upon 
personal characteristics and relationships. I quote her at length. 
 
“The norms governing market relations are impersonal, suitable for regulating 
the interactions of strangers. Each party to a market transaction views his relation 
to the other as merely a means to the satisfaction of ends defined independent of 
the relationship and of the other party’s ends. The parties have no pre-contractual 
obligations to provide each other with the goods they exchange. They deal with 
each other on an explicit, quid pro quo basis that serves to guarantee mobility. 
Because market transactions can be completed so as to leave no unpaid debts on  6
either side, they leave the parties free to switch trading partners at any time. The 
impersonality of market relations thus defines a sphere of freedom from personal 
ties and obligations. Impersonal freedom also implies that one need not exhibit 
specific personal characteristics or invoke special relationships to gain access to 
the goods traded on the market. Money income, not one’s social status, 
characteristics, or relationships, determines one’s access to commodities. The 
impersonality of the market has been evolving for centuries, and, in some cases, 
notably regarding discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and 
sexual orientation, it still has a long way to go.” (Anderson 1993, p. 145). 
 
In Anderson’s terms, commercial banks do not act as purveyors of a commodity. When 
those with a longstanding relationship to a banker—personal or businesslike—are able to obtain 
loans at special interest rates, Anderson’s condition that “Impersonal freedom also implies that 
one need not exhibit specific personal characteristics or invoke special relationships to gain 
access to the goods traded on the market” fails to hold. Consider Guseva and Rona-Tas’s 
finding that “Reliance on existing networks of trust allows Russian banks to issue cards to 
families and friends of top bank executives…Another solution is to stretch direct, personal ties. 
Trust is transitive. Friends and relatives of banks’ top executives and long-term customers often 
recommend potential cardholders, both formally and informally”(639). 
Anderson’s criterion of the irrelevance of relationships is also violated when “good 
customers” can obtain relatively inexpensive loans and maintain the flow of credit in bad times. 
Finally, it is not only relationships between the bank and the borrower that matter, but also ties 
between a borrower and a third party who has a social or business connection with the bank. 
Second, consider Anderson’s statement that “the norms governing market relations are 
impersonal, suitable for regulating the interactions of strangers.” Banks and their customers do 
not interact as strangers; they often know both their clients and their families quite well. One 
bank relationships manager related that “On the golf course, at a ball game, or the theatre, they 
[borrowers] will let their guard down more often. We exchange information—not like a 
marriage—more like dating” (Uzzi 1999, 488) 
Third, it is not true that “Money income, not one’s social status . . . “ determines access 
to credit. Guseva and Rona-Tas point out in the context of the Russian credit card market  
that banks “target people of a high social profile, for example, individuals holding positions of 
economic or political power or those who are famous. They are deemed trustworthy both 
because they tend to be affluent and because they are securely anchored at the top of the 
national social hierarchy.” (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001, 640).  7
Fourth, banks see their relationships with customers as more than instruments to achieve 
their private ends; the relationships themselves have value to both partners: “the optimization is 
not a strict economic one because it integrates both a psychological and a social dimension. 
When a client declares bankruptcy, the banker does not only see the failure of a client but also 
the failure of a friend . . . The nature of these exchanges is not purely economic. They are 
symbolic and social, too” (Ferrary 2003, 689). Uzzi argues that his data indicate that “even in a 
business culture that uses the yardstick of money to gauge value, banks and clients develop 
expressive bonds that affect their economic decisions” (1999, 501). 
Fifth, “The embedding of commercial transactions in social attachments promotes the 
benefits discussed above by enacting expectations of trust and reciprocal obligation that actors 
espouse as the right and proper protocols for governing exchange with persons they come to 
know well” (Uzzi 1999, pp. 483–484). This conflicts with Anderson’s point that when goods are 
treated as commodities, “The parties have no pre-contractual obligations to provide each other 
with the goods they exchange. They deal with each other on an explicit, quid pro quo basis that 
serves to guarantee mobility.” The conflict here is not that benefits are not exchanged between a 
bank and a borrower. To take an example of reciprocal obligation from everyday life, friends 
may exchange favors with one another but not expect that any particular favor will be 
reciprocated immediately and at equal value. They feel obligated to behave in certain ways 
because of a long history of exchanges, both metaphorical and literal.  
What is the role of all these social influences on access to credit? Some clearly serve no 
ends other than the prejudices of the lender. Do some of the social aspects of credit ensure 
honesty or serve any other economic function, or do they merely amount to nepotism, elitism, 
and racism? 
According to evidence gathered by social economists and sociologists, bankers believe 
that the types of social strategies enumerated here help them make sure loans are paid back—the 
problem cited by the imperfect-information Keynesians. (Of course, as these scholars 
acknowledge, new problems are created by the exclusion of borrowers based on these social 
criteria.) 
Close relationships ease the flow of information. According to one “relationship manager”: 
 
“A relationship on a social basis tends to break a lot of ice and develop a 
relationship that’s more than cold facts, interest rates, and products. It’s an  8
emotion-based bond.. that’s so important to have.. [because] the customer will let 
us know about problems early, so we can correct them” (Uzzi 1999, 488). 
 
Also, in many cases, honesty is enforced by the threat of ostracism (Ferrary 2003, 688). 
A business person who does not act in good faith may find it difficult to do business anywhere 
in the community. 
Sociologists emphasize the economic function even of partnerships that take on a 
fraternal guise. “Transactors anticipate that others will not voluntarily engage in opportunistic 
behavior. Instead, exchange partners share the belief that these motives, coupled with access to 
private information, can enlarge the pool of potentially beneficial transactions that are not 
available through market means” (Uzzi 1999, 484). 
Thus, relationships between bankers and businesspeople may draw upon motives that are 
normally not considered economic, but some believe the end result is economically beneficial to 
all parties involved. In one author’s words, socially embedded ties both “create unique value” 
and “motivate exchange partners to share the value” (Uzzi 1999, 483 [emphasis in original]). 
The sociological studies of banking cited here indicate an aspect not emphasized by 
imperfect-information Keynesians or most other economists: personal and social relationships 
of trust, and not just business relationships, are involved. They help solve informational 
problems without formal contracts, collateral, credit rationing, and so on. These relationships 
are not only “dyads” of two firms, but groups of people with multiple ties. These social 
relationships permit the free flow of information, and they also help ensure honesty by putting 
“social capital” at stake. But the friendships involved often take on a logic and purpose all their 
own, reorienting business activity partly toward social ends (the desire and compulsion to 
reciprocate the favors of a friend), rather than profit maximization. 
The important things to note about the social view of banking are: (1) that social 
economists and sociologists agree that the main function of banks is to help ensure the selection 
of “good” borrowers and their repayment of loans; (2) that sociologists emphasize the role of 
non-economic relationships, such as friendships, in which business partnerships are embedded; 
and (3) social economists cite the importance of other aspects of relationships than the flow of 
information, such as social pressures that help ensure honest behavior. 
  9
IMPERFECT-INFORMATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC THEORIES OF BANKING: 
SOME QUALIFICATIONS 
 
Existing theories of banking set forth by imperfect-information Keynesians and social 
economists clearly show that commercial banking is not merely the sale of certain services on a 
market. Banking involves ongoing interactions between banks and their best customers. But 
both groups leave some issues unexamined.  
First, good friendships are characterized by honesty. But often, intimate relationships 
drive people to keep some bad news unspoken, if revealing them might bring shame. For 
example, many people are more likely to give personal information to their psychologists, with 
whom they have a strictly professional relationship, than to close friends. There are conceivably 
things that one might confide to a member of the clergy but be unable to broach even with one’s 
mate.  
  Second, by the time banker and client become friends, it may be too late to stop a 
project. It seems unlikely that client and banker would immediately scrap a project once they 
became friends and discovered that the project was risky or fraudulent. If a pair of individuals 
has a great deal invested in a particular project (including their emotions), it may be in their 
interests to keep problems to themselves. Another reason honesty is less likely to prevail than 
one might think is the fact that businessperson and banker are often drawn to one another by 
commonalities or relationships that predate whatever loans are granted and that tend to 
transcend business matters. Both parties are privy to much information even before a transaction 
is formally considered, and the banker is as likely to be a coconspirator as a whistle-blower. A 
system of kickbacks, for example, is most likely to be successful when there is trust among the 
businessmen involved in the scheme (Granovetter 1985, 491–492). 
Third, when business relationships are governed by the norms of personal relationships, 
the relationship might come to take precedence over the business venture itself. If the banker 
and his or her client are enjoying one another’s company too much, they may not be productive 
when they meet. Close personal relations to a client might easily have the effect of blinding the 
banker to the flaws of the project.  Granovetter notes that business relationships are not simply 
altruistic but rather involve the rational pursuit of “sociability, approval, status, and power” 
(1985, 506).  10
Fourth, while commodification of a good such as sex may rob it of its essence, some 
goods actually are commodities and are best seen in that light (Anderson 1993, 180–181). This 
can particularly be the case if one party to a relationship uses a pretext of genuine care to 
strengthen his or her economic position vis-à-vis the other party. One thinks of certain 
corporations that use a paternalistic stance toward their employees to extract more effort or gain 
consent to exploitative conditions. Also, many salespeople encourage their customers to think of 
them as friends, so that they become reluctant to slam the door or refuse an offer. If “personal” 
banking fits into the same category as these situations, it may not improve efficiency over all but 
rather enable banker or client to gain the upper hand and appropriate value rather than creating 
it. Large corporations are unlikely to be taken advantage of in this way, as they typically have 
access to money markets and can achieve a great deal of bargaining power by searching for the 
best deal among a number of banks. Smaller firms, on the other hand, are less sophisticated than 
large corporations and exercise less choice among lenders, so they may be vulnerable to 
manipulation in a social context (Uzzi 1999, 485).  
Fifth, the rhetoric of “value-creation” may be misleading, in that oftentimes relationships 
come about because products are “tied” together in such a manner as to share rents that would 
otherwise be reaped by stockholders or consumers. Banks often provide needed loans as a 
compensation for other (more profitable) business: a recent survey of top financial officers of 
large corporations found that 56 percent “believed that a commercial bank had refused to lend 
funds or changed the terms on which it was willing to lend because the company did not agree 
to do other business with the bank” (Atlas 2003). This form of marketing is illegal, and at best it 
is a form of anti-competitive behavior; at worst it amounts to a form of bribery. Recently, courts 
have found that certain investment-banking firms have provided executives with opportunities 
to buy securities from initial public offerings, which can be very lucrative, as a way of soliciting 
other forms of business (Thomas 2003). Clearly, there is a difference between sharing the 
benefits of honest behavior and this sort of mutual back-scratching.  
Sixth, it may be that socializing between banker and borrower is merely a cultural 
expectation or a form of conspicuous consumption, in no way necessary for whatever business 
is transacted. Even in this case, an individual who declines to socialize may risk losing a loan, 
but the loss would merely reflect the fact that norms of conduct had been violated. If I fail to 
shake hands with a colleague, I might find it difficult to conduct business with him or her. But 
the practice of shaking hands does not itself serve any economic function independent of its  11
cultural acceptance and symbolic import. There may be many occasions in which people shake 
hands without conducting any business whatsoever. Similarly, playing golf, enjoying a drink at 
happy hour, or attending a baseball game may simply serve a social function or mark the 
participants as members of an elite. 
All of these observations suggest that, while relationships between bankers and their 
business customers are an important factor in lending activities, they are not always 
economically functional. In fact, they may represent an inefficiency or a waste of resources. 
Business may be thoroughly mixed with pleasure, but no clear causal relationship may exist 
between the two.  
From a policy perspective, this section, then, demonstrates that some of the rituals of 
banking may be less useful than some people believe; the world might not suffer too much if 
they were eliminated in favor of more anonymous forms of lending. However, the anecdotal 
evidence gathered by Ferrary (2003) and Uzzi (1999) that socializing acts as an enforcement 
mechanism should be taken seriously. The view propounded here is that form does not merely 
follow function.  
 
ANOTHER WAY OF THINKING ABOUT BANKERS’ RELATIONSHIPS 
 
An alternative way of viewing the “relationship” aspect of banking, and one that may 
encompass some of the other ideas expressed by imperfect-information and social economists, is 
to see the attribution or perception of risk as social to the core (Douglas 1992; Dymski 1998). 
First, perceptions of risk tend to be shared by social groups or by an entire culture. Groups of 
people tend to regard other groups as bearing risk, with individual characteristics being a 
secondary consideration.  One thinks of caste societies, in which members of some groups are 
believed to contaminate others merely by touching them. Often these sorts of beliefs are fostered 
by a kind of mass hysteria, as, for example, in the case of the AIDS epidemic. 
The same risk may be regarded as more or less threatening, depending upon its social 
context. In particular, risk among socially connected individuals may be underestimated or 
regarded as acceptable. In many cultures, people use other family members’ plates without 
washing them, but would never do the same with strangers’ or even friends’ dinnerware. And in 
traditional caste societies, dirtiness and contamination are associated with particular groups.  12
Certain neighborhoods in the United States are dangerous and susceptible to public health 
problems; this phenomenon is certainly in part a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
One observer points out that “Cultural values and social location have always provided 
the materials for self-serving constructions of epidemiological risk. The poor, the alien, the 
sinner have all served as convenient objects for such stigmatizing speculations” (Rosenberg, 
quoted in Douglas 1992, p. 36). 
Second, socially shared notions of risk are not inculcated in a process separate from, and 
prior to, doing business. The acquisition of knowledge about risk is accomplished during golf 
games and other meetings. Douglas’s diagnosis of modern theories of risk perception is as 
follows: “Public perception of risk is treated as if it were the aggregated response of millions of 
private individuals. Among other well-known fallacies of aggregated choice, it fails to take 
account of persons’ interaction with one another, their advice to one another, and their 
persuasions and intersubjective mobilizations of belief” (1992, 40). Or, “Embeddedness [of 
business relations in social ones] changes actors’ motives rather than treats them as immutable. 
While RMs [relationship managers] may build networks to gain access to private information, 
enacting a relationship also attenuates the narrow aims that may have motivated it originally” 
(Uzzi 1999, 500–501). One way of thinking about this is to say that tranactors not only acquire 
information from one another but also create something new: a relationship of trust. Trust is 
developed between particular individuals in an ongoing process as business takes place 
(Granovetter 1985, 486). 
Extending these observations to policy questions, commercial banking, in drawing 
business people into intimate relationships, may create as many problems as it solves. If banking 
draws its strengths from social relationships and commonalities, by nature it will exclude certain 
individuals who do not enjoy the needed social connections. If attributions of risk are culturally 
relative, it may be better to allocate credit on a more anonymous basis through an institution 
such as the bond market. 
Also, the institutional features of banking, to the extent they contribute to certain forms 
of bias in the assessment of risk and the allocation of credit, may be subject to debate or 
criticism. If banking relationships are used for risk reduction as much as risk perception, then 
relationships may create creditworthiness, rather than the converse. The proper institutional 
framework might encourage the formation of needed relationships that would not otherwise 
exist. Banks that hired loan officers from more diverse socio-economic, racial, ethnic  13
backrounds might find that the potential for profitable business existed in some hitherto 
neglected places. Not all useful business relationships are to be found at golf courses. 
  Consider some examples in which risk is perceived and handled in an unconventional 
institutional context. The Grameen bank of Bangladesh has demonstrated that extremely poor 
borrowers who lack credit in almost all societies can be reliable, at least given the right kind of 
institutional support. Compartamos, a similar Mexico City financial institution lending to very 
poor women, has a default rate of just over two percent (Weiner 2003). It is interesting to note 
that this organization uses some of the same social techniques as more traditional banks. When 
the bank opens for business in a new town, officers seek out the most highly respected women 
to obtain advice on establishing lending institution (para. 23). Who is qualified for credit 
depends upon whom one asks. This phenomenon can also be observed in industrialized 
economies: studies indicate that small business loans granted under the Community 
Reinvestment Act are just as profitable on average as regular loans (Thomas 2002, 22).  
These examples of the social theory at work show that commercial banks are not very 
effective or evenhanded in discerning risk. They are biased toward groups from which their 
customer base has traditionally been drawn. They accept certain cultural givens, such as the 
notion that the elite are more likely to pay money back to the bank. Having done all this, they 
fail to recognize their own biases, insisting that their risk control techniques are objective and 
scientific. As a result, they fail to offer disadvantaged borrowers the same sort of embedded 
relationships that allow more conventional businesses to flourish. Appropriate government 
policies, along with idealistic and ambitious individuals, might alleviate this problem. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF COMMODIFICATION 
 
What are the policy implications of the marketization of finance, in light of the skeptical 
interpretation of banks’ role offered above? Is marketization a development to be encouraged? 
Clearly, some of the most important implications of the sea change in banking are related to 
governance. Securities owners may be too far removed from the activities of a corporation to 
prevent insiders from engaging in fraud or managing poorly. The danger of lax governance has 
been illustrated recently by a string of corporate scandals.  
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Some would argue just the reverse: they say that investor capitalism, more than banker-
dominated capitalism, can potentially support the dynamism and efficiency of firms. These 
observers assert that this role for investors could be ensured if firms’ activities were made 
visible to outsiders, perhaps by assiduous accountants and regulators. Increased transparency 
would also help insure that securities were priced correctly, helping to improve efficiency. Well-
informed traders could impose discipline on corporate managers by selling shares of poorly 
performing companies (Rajan and Zingales 2003). It is therefore in the interests of good 
governance, in this view, to eliminate cozy banker-borrower relationships, which often allow 
inefficient activities to go unchecked (remember Mazda-Sumitomo). 
This argument about governance depends upon the risk assessment abilities and other 
knowledge of securities holders. But Keynes, in chapter 12 of the General Theory, showed that 
securities pricing is not rational. Investors never operate with full knowledge of the prospects of 
a company or how it should be managed. Empirical evidence of this fact is provided by the wide 
swings in stock values that take place in very short periods of time. If one could somehow 
calculate the “correct” value of a stock, it would not be as volatile as market prices. The 
technology stock boom of the 1990s is just one example. If investors lack the information to 
price stocks rationally, it is hard to see how they can ensure proper management, even with 
adequate accounting standards. In comparison, bankers have a wealth of information at their 
disposal and are not as skittish as securities holders, partly because their investments are 
illiquid. 
The social theory of risk provides support for the Keynesian argument. Douglas believed 
that scientific measures of risk are often as unreliable as those of traditional societies and might 
have been skeptical of the ability of a particular new form of finance to solve the problem once 
and for all. Both Keynes and Douglas argued that the perception of risk was based largely upon 
convention and mass psychology, as well as the bias of the perceiver. The degree of risk of a 
future project is in principle unknowable. Whether through a securities market or a commercial 
banking system, risk is always dealt with through social means. No particular forms of finance, 
in the abstract, can claim any special ability to solve the problem of risk, or of governance. 
This casts doubt on a second purported benefit of securities finance: the notion that 
competitive securities markets somehow democratize the allocation of capital. Proponents of 
this view often cite cases such as the Grameen bank (Rajan and Zingales 2003, 4), but as we  15
have seen, institutions of that type rely on many of the strategies used by relationship bankers, 
rather than the arm’s-length relationships touted by these proponents.  
Some authors have argued that individual investors are more willing to take risks on 
innovative ideas and upstart entrepreneurs than are traditional banks. Banks often make 
decisions by consensus and have a great stake in maintaining their reputations; therefore, 
according to some, they are biased toward established, conventional projects. But it is 
interesting to note that the supporters of securities-based finance use examples such as that of a 
Stanford Business School graduate wanting to start a new business (Rajan and Zingales, 2003, 
5). It is only in a highly idealized, and probably unattainable, financial system that ordinary 
individuals could issue bonds. (The only possible exception is the venture capital market, which 
has recently shown its limitations. It does not operate on principles of perfect competition.) 
One rather radical solution to the governance and access problems associated with 
marketized lending would be to enhance the relationship of firms with their workers as a 
replacement for their dealings with bankers, by allowing workers to carry a dual role as 
investors. This approach would offer the same kind of checks and balances, long-term 
perspective, and intimate relationship and would introduce the views of individuals from 
working-class backgrounds. Workers may be the only group to know more about a firm than its 
bankers. As owners, they have a vested interest in a firm’s success and would have an interest in 
preventing wasteful or greedy behavior by managers. (Of course, ownership must be 
accompanied by control; if workers are mere passive investors, they will have no impact on 
governance.) Workers, like traditional banks, would not dump their investment based upon their 
animal spirits. They might be willing and able to help see a firm through hard times because 
they are rooted in their companies and share a stake in their long-run success. An ongoing 
process of worker involvement, much like bank involvement, could go beyond the provision of 
finance to an improvement in governance. 
Finding ways to give workers equity interests in firms would provide more financial 
stability. Greider (2003) has described some successful company turnarounds executed with the 
help of capital from union and other pension funds. In a similar vein, the reach and financial 
footing of community development banks could be enlarged; such institutions tend to take a 
long view of investment decisions. This approach would aid effective governance without 
simply moving backward to a world in which traditional bankers, with their hidebound 
traditions, held enormous economic power.  16
What worker ownership and bank capitalism have in common is the use of “voice” 
rather than “exit” as a means of control (Hirschman 1970). Securities holders who believe that a 
firm is poorly managed can exit (or threaten to exit) by selling their positions. But insiders such 
as workers, who cannot readily exit, can provide input through the use of “voice” in decision-
making. Much as in a marriage, many problems can be solved short of the threat of separation. 
This is in fact one of the chief benefits of marriage. A marriage partner may be good or bad ex 
ante, but he or she may become a better partner if conditions within the relationship are 
favorable to constructive and honest discussion. The quality of a partner is endogenous to the 
relationship.  
Another implication of securitization involves Community Reinvestment Act 
regulations, which require that all banks set aside some of their loans and investments for 
underserved groups and areas (Thomas 2002). Potentially, these rules go beyond governance to 
allow people from diverse backgrounds to start their own firms. Studies show that these laws 
have been somewhat successful, but they are subject to certain types of bank evasion.  
One such form of circumvention is to meet the letter of the law by investing in securities, 
CDs, and mutual fund shares backed by certain forms of loans to disadvantaged firms and 
consumers, rather than by directly lending. Often these instruments are bought and sold several 
times in order to gain multiple credits for the same underlying investment (Thomas 2002, 14). 
Unfortunately, this type of investment deprives the borrower of the type of ongoing relationship 
with a major lending bank that is such a key to obtaining additional services, as bankers lose 
interest in minority firms once they have met their legal requirements. Moreover, some of the 
investments recently acquired by major banks fall on the borderline between “subprime” and 
“predatory” loans. The latter involve unfair terms and are sometimes granted with the 
anticipation that the borrower will default. The lender has no stake in the success of the 
borrower, since failure is anticipated from the beginning. Surely, no lender and borrower who 
enjoyed a good personal relationship would enter into such loan contracts. The law should 
probably changed at the next opportunity to encourage more conventional loans that may create 
the kind of social connections needed by minority- and women-owned businesses. This 
argument illustrates that the type of relationship that exists between a banker and its customer 
may reflect economic power. Disempowered people may find it difficult to form beneficial 
relationships. Good policy should be aimed at compensating for inequalities of power. 
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A final area of policy concern is the effect of marketization on macroeconomic policy. 
Some economists believe that central banks’ control of the supply of bank reserves is less potent 
as a policy instrument than it was when bank borrowing was a more dominant form of finance. 
Banks are required to hold reserves in proportion to certain types of liabilities, such as checking 
accounts, which they need in order to fund their lending activities. Thus, the theory goes, the 
central bank can constrain the volume of bank lending by trading government bonds for 
reserves.  
But, the argument goes, no reserves are needed when a firm finances itself by selling a 
bond to some type of investor other than a bank. Nonbank investors, such as insurance 
companies and mutual funds, can purchase as many bonds as they would like without holding 
any reserves. So, the central bank may lack any tool with which to control an economy that is 
growing too rapidly on the foundation of borrowed money, or to cool an overheated market for 
some form of asset. 
This line of reasoning has led many observers to call for “asset-based reserve 
requirements” that would apply to any institution holding bonds (Palley 2003; D’Arista 2002). 
But the problem these measures would purportedly address is not new, and the proffered 
remedies might not be strong enough to solve the problem.  
First of all, it is now recognized by many economists of different stripes that central 
banks have little discretion in supplying reserves to the banking system (Le Bourva 1992 
[1958]; Moore 1988; Wray 1990, 1998). Banks purchase only enough reserves to satisfy 
regulations and to meet unexpected needs. If the Fed attempts to increase the amount of reserves 
in existence, it will merely drive the federal funds rate downward very rapidly. It does not do 
this, because it usually operates with a nonzero interest rate target.  
So, even in the old days, when commercial banking was much more important than it is 
today, control of the monetary stock was beyond the reach of central banks. In that respect, the 
newer emerging forms of finance will not present any new problems. What offers more of a 
policy challenge is that ties between lender and borrower are weaker now than in the past. 
Davidson (2002, 10, 181) points out that securities markets, being “liquid,” have both 
advantages and disadvantages over other forms of finance. A person is more willing to lend his 
or her savings at a low price if he or she can potentially get the money back in short order. But 
liquid markets are unstable for exactly the same reason: the ability to buy and sell securities 
rapidly opens the door to destabilizing speculation.  18
This analysis of the distinctive virtues of liquid markets does not fully apply to banks 
(Bossone 2002). They are able to “transform” illiquid assets (loan contracts) into liquid 
instruments, such as transactions accounts. The bank itself is certainly committed to holding its 
more illiquid assets for an extended period of time, but depositors can withdraw their funds at 
any time. Thus, commercial banks do not seem to suffer a disadvantage compared to 
bondholders, at least as far as providing lenders with liquidity is concerned.  
Some observers have proposed that central banks reduce the liquidity of financial 
markets by imposing small ad valorem taxes on sales of securities. Davidson (2002, 200–212) 
has argued that such “transactions taxes” would be ineffective, because they would not be large 
enough to outweigh the perceived gains from speculation. Another area of concern would be 
that even if day-to-day volatility were reduced by such a tax, longer-term changes in returns 
would continue. As long as such fluctuations take place, investors will attempt to profit from the 
movements of interest rates, amplifying those movements in the process.  
A bolder policy action might reduce the problems associated with speculation in liquid 
assets. The Federal Reserve could actually engage in purchases and sales of a wider variety of 
assets than it does currently, including long-term government bonds and conceivably even 
private securities.  It would then be able to peg the values of some classes of assets, rather than 
merely discouraging short-term speculation. In this way, the economy would enjoy the benefits 
of securitization while maintaining some stability (preventing crashes) in the financial sector. 





A sea change has taken place in how firms and homebuyers obtain finance. Some have argued 
that the old system, in which people knew the bankers intimately, was functional because it 
allowed lenders to have a peak at inside information as to the viability and legitimacy of a 
project. Others argue that it is the new system that achieves the greatest efficiency and should 
therefore be promoted by policy. The thrust of this paper is that both forms of finance can be 
either functional or dysfunctional (especially in their handling of risk) and the means exist to 
make them more functional. In the current system or in any conceivable reformed system, social 
relations will form the basis for both types of finance. Rather than attempting to dismantle  19
“relationship finance” in the name of some utopian system free of social influences, efforts 
should be made to make both forms of finance more stable and democratic.  20
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